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PREVIEW; United States v. Cooley: Tribal Police Authority Over a 
Non-Indian on a Public Right-of-Way in Indian Country 
Shelby Danna* 
The United States Supreme Court is set to hear oral argument in 
the matter of United States of America v. Joshua James Cooley on 
Tuesday, March, 23, 2021, at 9:00 a.m. via telephone. Jeffery B. Wall will 
likely appear on behalf of the Petitioner, United States of America. Eric R. 




This case presents a question about tribal jurisdiction in Indian 
Country over non-Indians. Specifically, the Court will decide whether a 
tribal police officer has the authority to detain and search a non-Indian on 
a public right-of-way within a reservation for a possible violation of state 
or federal law. 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On February 26, 2016, Joshua Cooley and his child were sitting in 
a parked truck with Wyoming license plates on the westbound shoulder of 
U.S. Route 212 at around 1:00 a.m.1 This portion of the highway is within 
the Crow Indian Reservation in southern Montana.2 Around that time, law 
enforcement officer for the Crow Police Department, James D. Saylor, 
drove past Mr. Cooley’s truck and decided to stop for a welfare check on 
the vehicle’s occupants.3 During the encounter, Officer Saylor perceived 
that Mr. Cooley was a non-Indian and had bloodshot eyes.4 Mr. Cooley 
informed Officer Saylor that he travelled to Lame Deer to purchase a 
vehicle from a man named Thomas “Spang” or Thomas “Shoulderblade.”5 
Mr. Cooley was unsure of Thomas’s last name.6 Officer Saylor recognized 
both potential names: Thomas Shoulderblade was a local probation 
officer, and Thomas Spang was “associated with drug activities on the 
Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation.”7  
Based on the surrounding circumstances, including the time of 
night, the Wyoming license plates, and the reference to a “Thomas,” 
Officer Saylor concluded that Mr. Cooley’s story did not make sense.8 Mr. 
Cooley then became agitated and, at Officer Saylor’s request, lowered the 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana, Class of 2021. 
1 Brief for Petitioner at 4, United States v. Cooley, https://perma.cc/EM4L-6ZYC (U.S. Jan. 8, 2021) 
(No. 19-1414) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. 
2 Id.  
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 5. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Brief for Respondent at 5, United States v. Cooley, https://perma.cc/NB5U-XDJL (U.S. Feb. 20, 
2021) (No. 19-1414) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. 
8 Id. 
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window further.9 Officer Saylor saw two rifles in the passenger seat and 
ordered Mr. Cooley to produce identification, while continuing to 
interrogate him.10 Mr. Cooley, searching for identification, started slurring 
his speech, and his breathing became shallow and rapid.11 Concerned, 
Officer Saylor ordered Mr. Cooley to show his hands and to again produce 
identification.12 Mr. Cooley produced his Wyoming driver’s license.13 
Officer Saylor ordered Mr. Cooley out of his truck and performed a pat 
down search. Officer Saylor placed him in the back of the patrol car while 
waiting for back up.14 To secure the area, Officer Saylor went back to Mr. 
Cooley’s truck, where he seized the ignition key and weapons, and 
discovered a glass pipe and plastic bag that appeared to contain 
methamphetamine.15 When backup officers from the county and the 
federal Bureau of Indian Affairs arrived, they transported Mr. Cooley to 
the Crow Police Department, where he was interviewed and arrested by a 
county officer.16  
Mr. Cooley was charged by a federal grand jury with one count of 
possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and one count of possessing a firearm in furtherance of 
a drug-trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(a).17 Mr. 
Cooley moved to suppress evidence on the ground that Officer Saylor 
exceeded the Crow Tribe’s authority during the seizure, in violation of the 
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (“ICRA”), 25 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.18 The 
district court granted the motion, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed.19 This appeal followed. 
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. Petitioner United States’ Argument 
Petitioner argues on appeal that, as independent sovereigns, Indian 
tribes retain the inherent authority to reasonably investigate and detain 
non-Indians within tribal reservations for potential violations of state or 
federal law.20 Petitioner states that United States v. Wheeler21 further 
solidified these longstanding rights, because they have not been 
diminished by treaty or statute.22 Further, Petitioner contends ICRA’s 
Fourth Amendment analogue ensures the public is adequately protected 
and laws are enforced on Indian reservations.23 The policy behind this 
 
9 Id.  
10 Id. 
11 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 6. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 7. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 7–8.  
17 Brief for Respondent, supra note 7, at 8. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 8–9. 
20 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 17. 
21 435 U.S. 313 (1978). 
22 Id. at 323. 
23 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 14. 
2021                       PREVIEW: UNITED STATES V. COOLEY   100 
inherent authority, Petitioner maintains, is to ensure tribal police have the 
right to respond to criminal activity and protect themselves and others 
from harm.24 
Petitioner then argues that, historically, the Court has never 
questioned a tribe’s authority to police and patrol roads and rights-of-way 
within reservation boundaries and to detain non-tribal members and turn 
them over to state officers for violating state law.25 Petitioner asserts the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision restricts the ability of tribal officers to investigate 
and detain non-Indians on public rights-of-way within reservation 
boundaries, which directly conflicts with precedent and tribal authority.26 
Petitioner further contends the Ninth Circuit’s approach would 
limit tribal officers on public rights-of-way to only stop individuals known 
to be Indian, or whose Indian status is unknown, that are violating only 
tribal law.27 This approach is problematic, Petitioner maintains, because it 
would preclude investigation that would otherwise be constitutional under 
the Fourth Amendment and Terry v. Ohio28 and would lead to an increase 
in crime.29 
In summation, Petitioner argues the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
would leave a gap in law enforcement on Indian reservations—a gap that 
can be easily filled by tribal police, and the decision should be vacated and 
remanded for further proceedings.30 
B. Respondent Cooley’s Argument 
Respondent argues that powers over non-Indians on public rights-
of-way have never been included in an Indian tribe’s inherent sovereign 
authority.31 According to Respondent, when Officer Saylor concluded Mr. 
Cooley was a non-Indian, he lacked the authority to investigate and detain 
him and thus violated ICRA.32 Respondent asserts that, historically, tribal 
sovereignty was limited to self-government.33 Respondent cites to 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe34 for the proposition that when tribal 
officers detain, search, and seize a non-Indian, they intrude on that non-
Indian’s personal liberty and unlawfully exceed the tribes’ 
Congressionally delegated powers.35 Respondent further contends the 
United States prioritizes, above all else, protecting its citizens from 
intrusions over their personal liberty, which directly conflicts with the 
 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 12 (citing Strate v. A-1 Contr’s., 520 U.S. 438, 456 (1997)). 
26 Id. at 15. 
27 Id. 
28 391 U.S. 1 (1968). 
29 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 16. 
30 Id. 
31 Brief for Respondent, supra note 7, at 10. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. (citing Plains Commr’c. Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 328 (2008)). 
34 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
35 Id. at 209. 
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notion that Indian tribes have retained police power over non-Indians.36 
Respondent also notions that Mcgirt v. Oklahoma37 established that 
Congress is the exclusive authority over Indian affairs, and the courts 
should defer to Congress to fill any jurisdictional gaps.38  
In summation, Respondent argues ICRA does not create tribal 
police jurisdiction over non-Indians, and the Ninth Circuit appropriately 
upheld the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of the illegal 
searches and seizures.39 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The question before the Court is whether the lower courts erred in 
granting a motion to suppress evidence on the basis that a tribal police 
officer lacked authority to temporarily detain and search Respondent, a 
non-Indian, within a reservation on a public right-of-way, based on a 
potential violation of state or federal law. The outcome could limit tribal 
authority on public rights-of-way, as well as affect tribal criminal 
procedure. However, the Court here will likely find for Petitioner United 
States, on the grounds that public rights-of-way within reservations are 
included in the definition of “Indian Country,” and the Court has never 
suggested the tribes’ authority to patrol and protect on-reservation 
highways excludes non-Indian suspects. 
Questions of criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country generally 
depend on the following three factors: (1) the location of the crime; (2) the 
Indian status of the offender and victim; and (3) the nature of the crime.40 
Further, criminal jurisdiction of offenses committed in Indian Country “is 
governed by a complex patchwork of federal, state, and tribal law.”41 The 
Indian Law and Order Commission went as far as to say, “criminal 
jurisdiction in Indian Country is an indefensible morass of complex, 
conflicting, and illogical commands, layered in over decades via 
congressional policies and court decisions and without the consent of tribal 
nations.”42 Despite the complexities of this system, it is long standing 
Circuit precedent that tribes retain inherent authority to reasonably protect 
persons and property within reservation boundaries from Indian or non-
Indian suspects—a right Congress has never eliminated.43 ICRA’s Fourth 
Amendment analogue also maintains that a tribal officer may stop on 
reasonable suspicion, and further detain on probable cause, non-Indian 
suspects for custody and potential prosecution by state or federal 
 
36 Brief for Respondent, supra note 7, at 11. 
37 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2019). 
38 Brief for Respondent, supra note 7, at 11. 
39 Id. at 13. 
40 Brief for the Former United States Attorneys as Amicus Curiae at 5, United States v. Cooley, 
https://perma.cc/82RQ-X9HH (U.S. Jan. 15, 2021) (No. 19-1414). 
41 Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 102 (1993). 
42 ILOC, A Roadmap for Making Native America Safer, Report to the President and Congress of the 
United States, at ix (Nov. 2013), https://perma.cc/TJU5-L3GF.  
43 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 17. 
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authorities.44 Additionally, Title 18 U.S.C. § 1151 defines “Indian 
Country” broadly, and provides in full: 
(a) All land within the limits of any Indian reservation 
under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, 
notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and including 
rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all 
dependent Indian communities within the borders of the 
United States whether within the original or subsequently 
acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without 
the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the 
Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, 
including rights-of-way running the same.45 
In Strate v. A-1 Contractors,46 the Court addressed the scope of 
tribal authority in situations involving the same type of land at issue in this 
case—a public highway over Indian reservation land.47 Although the 
Court held tribes lack the authority to adjudicate civil tort disputes between 
non-Indians arising from state rights-of-way, the Court distinguished a 
tribe’s authority to police the activities of non-Indians on a reservation’s 
public roads.48 The Court further emphasized that the Court has never 
“questioned the authority of tribal police to patrol roads within a 
reservation, including rights-of-way made part of a state highway, and to 
detain and turn over to state officers non-members stopped on the highway 
for conduct violating state law.”49  
Respondent maintains that inherent tribal sovereignty does not 
include police power over non-Indians on rights-of-way, and Officer 
Saylor’s search and seizure of Respondent was outside tribal authority, 
because he identified Respondent as a non-Indian, and the search and 
seizure took place on a public right-of-way.50 However, the well-settled 
precedent establishes that public rights-of-ways on an Indian reservation 
are included in the definition of “Indian Country,” and the Court has not 
suggested that tribal authority to patrol these public rights-of-way 
excludes non-Indian suspects.51 In actuality, tribal officers may exercise 
their power to detain a suspected offender and transport them to the proper 
authorities, which Officer Saylor did when he notified the local county of 
the situation.52 If the Court ruled for the Respondent and affirmed the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision, it would severely limit a tribal officer’s authority 
to make an investigative stop of anyone on a public right-of-way, which 
would undermine a tribe’s authority to protect persons within reservation 
 
44 Id. at 8. 
45 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). 
46 520 U.S. 438 (1997).  
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 455–56 n.11.  
49 Id.  
50 Brief for Respondent, supra note 7, at 15. 
51 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 22. 
52 Id. 
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boundaries by prohibiting tribal police from detaining a non-Indian for an 
apparent or obvious state or federal crime during the encounter. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Court will likely reverse the Ninth Circuit’s decision and find 
for Petitioner United States. The Court will also likely follow Ninth Circuit 
precedent stating tribal officers may detain non-Indian suspects and 
transport them to the proper authorities. When Officer Saylor detained 
Respondent, secured the area, and subsequently notified the proper 
authorities to make an arrest, he was following the correct procedure to 
protect himself and others on tribal land. Based on the above facts and 
analysis, the Court will likely reverse and remand the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision for further proceedings.  
 
 
